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INTRODUCTION 
When branch banking is widely prevalent within a state, the 
share of all bank loans and leases going to commercial and 
industrial projects is larger. This conclusion is supported by 
analysis of lending data for banks in eight-states of the 
northwest in 1987. Of these states, four have statewide 
branching (Idaho, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington) and four 
have non-prevalent branching or unitary banking (Iowa, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, and Montana). While our results can explain only a 
small portion of the variation in the share of commercial and 
industrial lending, the contribution of branching is positive and 
significant. 
Additional findings in this study support the argument that 
laws that allow branch banking encourage more commercial and 
agricultural lending in nonmetropolitan counties. Because of 
limitations in the available data, the relative impact of 
branching laws on differences in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
lending patterns is difficult to determine (data on lending 
activity is available only at the headquarter banks of branching 
institutions; the only data available on individual branches 
concern deposits). In this study we use a proxy variable, the 
share of total deposits held by individual branches, to indicate 
the economic presence of branch banks in nonmetropolitan counties 
of six states (North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Montana, 
Washington and Iowa). 
Our results show that branching laws are positively related 
to more commercial-plus-agricultural lending by nonmetropolitan 
unit banks while the branching share of deposits is negatively 
related and softens the impact attributable to branching laws. 
An explanation for these findings, one that is supported by the 
literature, holds that branching stimulates local competition and 
total share of commercial-plus-agricultural lending. At the same 
time, branches compete with unit banks in local markets and, the 
greater the presence of branches, the smaller the net additional 
increase in new loans held by unit banks. 
The positive impact of branching on commercial credit lends 
support to the hypothesis that under branching, banks have 
relatively lower cost or lower risk in the analysis of potential 
commercial projects. Thus branches would be somewhat more likely 
to lend their assets to commercial borrowers than to put these 
assets into other uses (eg., consumer credit, real estate loans, 
loans to depository institutions, obligations of states and 
political subdivisions, lease financing, and other loans.) 
A review of the literature on the impact of branch banking 
is contained in the next section of this paper. This literature 
argues that branch banks may provide slightly more commercial 
credit in growing rural areas than unit banks; that branching has 
some cost advantage over restrictions; and that the efficiencies 
associated with branching are small. The following section of 
the paper presents the analysis of commercial lending activities 
in the eight states and finds a small, positive impact related to 
statewide branching. The final section of the P.aper presents 
conclusions about new policy to deregulate banking activity. 
:I. WHY BRANCHING MATTERS 
our concern in this project is to understand the extent to 
which credit for small business1projects is made available by banks in nonmetropolitan areas. The regulation of branch 
banking is the major tool available to these states to influence 
the spatial distribution of banking activity, including 
commercial lending. Thus, our primary concern is to discover if 
branching appears to change the relative spatial availability of 
commercial credit across the eight states. · 
Branching does appear to influence the portfolios and 
profitability of banks of different sizes and at various 
locations. This section of the paper contains a brief 
description of branch banking and a review of the literature on 
the effect of branching on commercial credit. 
Branch and Unit Banks in Rural Areas 
States may choose to regulate the intrastate branching of 
banks and the federal government regulates interstate branching. 
Regulation of intrastate branch banking is intended to affect the 
intrastate spatial distribution of banking activity. Because 
small businesses usually borrow locally, the supply of bank 
credit to small businesses in rural areas may be altered by 
branching. 
Branch banking occurs when a single bank is allowed to have 
one or more full sei:vice offices at separate locations. Each 
state determines the extent and kind of branching that it will 
1 In particular, the eight states of 
Foundation region: Minnesota, Iowa, North 
Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. 
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the Northwest Area 
and South Dakota, 
permit. As shown in Table 1, twenty-seven states allow unlimited 
branch banking including Idaho, Oregon, South Dakota, and 
Washington. Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and seventeen other 
states permit limited branching with geographical limitations on 
the locations of branches or, sometimes, with limitations on how 
branching is achieved. (Appendix A contains a brief description 
of the branch banking laws in the NWAF region.) For example, 
North Dakota allows branc~ing through mergers and consolidation 
of certain existing banks; the state does not allow de novo 
branching (i.e., through creation of new banks). Three states, 
Monta~a~ Colorado, and Wyoming, prohibit branch banking in any 
form. 
Banks that are not part of a branch banking firm are "unit" 
banks that either are independently owned or affiliates of a 
multi-bank holding company, MBHC. A MBHC owns two or more banks, 
each of which is operated as a separate banking firm. All states 
have some banks that are owned by MBHCs. In addition, units, 
branches, and affiliates can have physically detached 
"facilities" that provide limited banking services. 
Federal regulations affect branch banking across states. 
Under the Garn-st. Germaine Act of 1982, interstate branching is 
permitted only under reciprocal two-state arrangements approved 
by both states. Minnesota, for example, now allows bank holding 
companies from Wisconsin, Iowa, and North and South Dakota to 
acquire banks within the state, provided they allow Minnesota's 
holding companies similarly to acquire banks in their states. 
However, only Wisconsin has4approved such a reciprocity 
arrangement with Minnesota. 
Review of the Literature Regarding Branching --
The review of the literature on branch banking is divided 
into three parts. The first compares branch and unit banks in 
rural areas and argues that branch banks may provide more 
commercial credit than unit banks in growing rural areas. The 
second section presents discussion of the competitiveness of 
branch and unit banks and concludes that there are some 
advantages associated with branch bank offices. These advantages 
could translate into lower costs in rural communities and greater 
production of banking products, possibly including commercial 
2 Only existing banks that are owned by a multibank holding 
company are allowed to merge and branch. Minneapolis Federal 
Reserve, "Regional Recap," THE REGION August 1987, p. 18. 
3 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Washington D.C., June 
30, 1988. 
4 Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank, op cit. 
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loans. The extent of efficiencies associated with branching is 
small. The third section concerns the possible gains from a 
policy change to allow unlimited branching in limited branching 
states. 
Branch and Unit Banks in Rural Areas 
Commercial credit is more restricted in nonmetropolitan than 
metropolitan areas and regulation of banking may affect the 
lending activity and/or location of rural banks. Small, 
independ5nt businesses are often confined to local capital 
sources. While the market for most financial services is 
national in scope, there may be unfilled credit demands in rural 
areas where information costs for lenders remain high and where 
relatively few lenders have the physical presence that is 
important to evaluatini a borrower, the project, and the 
borrower's collateral. In addition, certain capital market 
imperfections may particularly affec7 credit available to small 
businesses in nonmetropolitan areas. These imperfections result 
from incomplete information, excess capacity, and other 
externalities. 
Branch banking poses both positive and negative incentives 
for the supply of local commercial credit. Branching can 
increase commercial credit in nonmetropolitan areas because 
branches are in a better position to spread the costs of local 
commercial lending across the whole bank. On the other hand, 
branching can reduce local credit because branches are in a 
better position to transfer assets to non-local markets. Of 
these two effects, it is not a priori clear which will 
predominate. 
The differences in activity between urban and non-urban 
banks are mostly accounted for by differences in bank size; small 
and medium sized banks show similar characteristics no matter 
where they are located. Rural banks tend to be small (although 
not all rurals are small and many small banks are located in 
5 Daniel L. Milkove and Patrick J. Sullivan, "Financial Aid 
Programs as a Component of Economic Development Strategy," Ch 14, 
RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1980's: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, 
U.S. Dept of Agriculture, ERS Staff Report No. AGES870724. 
6 Harvey Rosenbloom, "The Changing Nature of Financial Markets 
and the Implications for Credi+- Flows in Rural Areas," in RURAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS RESEARCH ISSUES FOR THE 1980s, PROCEEDINGS, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Dec 9 & 10, 1982. 
7 Julia Friedman, "Credit Rationing in Nonmetropolitan Markets 
for Small Business Loans," Working Paper Number 88-02, State and 
Regional Research Center, University of Minnesota, 1988. 
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urban areas). Very small banks -- with assets less that $15 
million -- tend to have poor return on assets no matter where 
they are located. The economies of scale that mgY result from 
branching could endanger these Y§..IT small banks. Somewhat 
larger (but still small) banks have relatively high profits~ with 
return on assets generally falling as bank size increases. 
small banks are more conservative lenders than large banks, 
with safer asset portfolios, fewer18orrowed reserves, and larger 
ratios of time to demand deposits. Rural banks are no more 
conservative than urban banks of the same size. However, because 
the share of bank assets held by small banks is much larger in 
rural areas (77.4 percent vs. 10.7 percent for urba~1areas), 
conservative banking is more likely in rural areas. 
In unit bank states, conservatism is more likely because the 
number of very large unit banks is small. The ability of a bank 
to grow depends upon equity capital which, in turn, depends 
partly on the ability to attract new deposits. A unit bank may 
be less able to provide multiple convenient locations for 
customers, hence is less likely to draw rapidly growing volumes 
of deposits. Unit banks must count relatively more on borrowed 
reserves to back their lending activities and growth. However, 
units also are more likely to stress commercial lending within 
their portfolios because th1~e banks have fewer offices to handle 
consumer loan applications. 
Small branch banks may lend more locally than small units 
because branches can more readily share the risks and costs of 
lending. Two opposing forces determine the average cost of 
commercial lending to a bank. The direct cost of a commercial 
loan varies little with the size of the loan. Average cost, 
therefore, is lower if the loan itself is larger. Larger loans, 
however, mean less portfolio diversity for the bank and greater 
risk. This risk brings greater indirect cost. To reduce 
portfolio risk and associated costs, small banks may join in some 
co-operative lending effort; possibly, branch banks are in a 
8 Daniel L. Milkove, DO BANK SIZE AND METRO-NOMETRO LOCATION 
AFFECT BANK BEHAVIOR? USDA/ERS, Rural Research Development Report 
No. 47, Washington D.C., USGOP, April 1985. 
9 Fraser and Kolari, op cit. 
lOibid. 
11Milkove, op cit. 
12Daniel Milkove, "Are Rural Banks Different or Just Small?", 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES, Vol 2, No. 1, October 1985, pp. 10-
15. 
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better position to create co-operative packages by "joint" 
lending from the home office. AlternativijY, a small bank can 
simply avoid commercial loans altogether. 
Further, banks in rural areas often are relatively isolated 
in the undiversified local market. Because the local economy may 
depend on a single sector or a few key businesses, there is a 
linkage of risk among all local loans in the bank's portfolio, 
including commercial, agricultural, real estate, and consumer 
loans. This greater risk attached to all local loans provides an 
incentive for unit1ianks to structure their portfolios to hold 
fewer local loans. 
Due to the linked-risk in local markets, 'small banks may 
lend relatively large shares of local assets to larger 
metropolitan banks. Rural branch banks are highly integrated 
with larger, urban banks and the flow of loanable funds can be 
vefy fluid within this integrated structure. Rural unit banks 
also funnel funds to larger, urban banks although the proces~5may 
be less automatic than for more vertically integrated banks. 
Rural banks avoid the risk associated with heavy lending in 
undiversified local markets by substituting 1) lower-risk loans 
to larger banks, 2) government securities, and 3) corporate 
securities for local lending. Also small banks base more lending 
on their deposits than large banks -- small banks often have more 
stable deposits, with larger ratios of time-deposits to demand-
deposits than larger banks. Thus sma111r,iral banks tend to 
transfer local savings to larger banks. 
Because funds flow easily with a branching system, branch 
banks are thought to provide more local credit than unit banks in 
high-demand rural areas. A study of rural banks in Arizona, an 
unlimited branching state, and rural banks in Colorado, a unit 
banking state, shows that loan-to-deposit ratios are positively 
correlated with local population in both states. On average, 
13 charles w. Haley, "Diversification Benefits and Economies 
of Scale in Loan Portfolios, It BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION, 
Federal Reserve of Chicago, May 1983. 
14 James J. Mikesell and Steven Davidson, "Financing Rural 
America: A Public Policy and Research Perspective," RURAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS: RESEARCH ISSUES FOR THE 1980s, PROCEEDINGS, Federal 
Reserve of Chicago, Dec 9 & 10, 1982. 
15constance R. Dunham, "Interstate BAnking and the Outflow of 
Local FundE'., 11 NEW ENGLAND ECONOMIC REVIEW, Mar/Ap 1986, pp. 7-19. 
16Donald R. Fraser and James W. Kolari, THE FUTURE OF SMALL 
BANKS IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass, 
1985, Chapter 4, Adjustment of Small Banks: The Last Two Decades. 
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Arizona's rural branches had larger variance in lending and lent 
more than Colorado's unit banks in faster growing areas and less 
in areas with low or negative growth. Even though branch banks 
approve proportionately more loans to non-local parties, they 
~lso lend J9re of their assets than unit banks when local demand 
is strong. 
Branch Banking and Competitiveness 
Does branch banking encourage or diminish competitiveness 
and efficiency within a state's banking system? If the system is 
more competitive, then a greater loan volume can be provided at 
lower interest rates. The predominant view in the literature is 
that branching improves competitiveness and may reduce costs. 
However, the greater concentration of banking activity within a 
smaller number of institutions is correlated with higher profits 
that, arguably, could result from exercise of monopoly power as 
well as from greater production efficiency. 
Even in states that prohibit complete branching, the banking 
industry is highly integrated through the activities of MBHCs. 
In Minnesota, higher profits have accrued to unit banks 
affiliated with MBHCs than to independently owned unit banks. 
The source of these greater profits, however, appears to be 
greater competitiveness in the pricing policy and services 
offered by affiliated banks. That is, large banks are believed 
to have cost and service advantages that lead to greater profits. 
In support of this argument researchers find that, while 
affiliates have earned more profit than units, large rural unit 
banks in counties with no affiliated1~anks have been the most 
profitable rural banks in Minnesota. 
Economies of scale in the banking industry will determine 
the efficient size of banking firm, i.e., the size at which 
average costs are minimized. Both unit banks and individual 
branch offices experience economies of scale at small sizes. The 
merger of two or more small unit banks into branches of the same 
firm probably does not reduce production costs, however, and 
there appear to be no overall economies for the branch banking 
firm. 
17David L. Barkley, Glenn T. Potts, and Cindy Mellon, "Effects 
of Banking Structure on the Allocation of Credit to Nonmetropolitan 
Cornrnuni ties, 11 WESTERN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Vol 9, No. 
2, Dec 1984, pp. 283-92. 
18 Arthur Rolnick, David S. Dahl, and Stanley L. Graham, 
"Looking for Evidence of Noncompetitive Behavior in Minnesota's 
Banking Industry, 11 QUARTERLY REVIEW, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Fall 1977, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1-7. 
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Branch offices experience scale economies up to a size of 
about $100 million in deposits (1978 dollars: $185 million in 
1988 dollars), at larger sizes average costi9stay about the same 
or increase up to about $1 billion in size. It is not known if 
very large banks with deposits of over $1 billion have economies 
or diseconomies of scale. However, while a branch of $100 
million in deposits has economies of scale, two or more branches 
of a single bank of the same size probably do not have the same 
cost advantages. Some research finds no signif~8ant scale 
economies for banking firms that have branches: other work finds 
diseconomies of scale (increasi2~· average costs) for branching 
firms over $25 million in size. The basic conclusion is that 
branching at best is cost neutral and perhaps is costly. "This 
finding is, in fact, consistent with the presence of economies of 
scale at the branch level since an increase in the number of 
branches, holding bank o~~put constant, also implies a decrease 
in average branch size." 
Unit banks experience much the same scale economies as 
branch offices. Average costs fall as veq small banks gro,4 Economies are exhausted after $25 million 3to $50 million size 
is reached (1978 dollars). 
Some economies of scope are observed for branch banks: none 
have been shown to exist in unit banks. Economies of scope occur 
when the cost of producing an extra unit of one output declines 
with the increased production of another output by the same firm. 
Branch banks show marginal cost reducing interaction between time 
deposits and real estate loans, so that as either activity 
increases the cost of the other decreases. Commercial lending 
does not generate scope economies and there are no demonstrated 
19George J. Benston, Allen N. Berger, Gerald A. Hanweck, and 
David B. Humphrey, "Economies of Scale and Scope in Banking," BANK 
STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May 
1983. 
20Ibid. 
21George J. Benston, Gerald A. Hanweck, and Daniel Humphrey, 
"Operating Costs in Banking, 11 ECONOMIC REVIEW, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, Vol 67, Nov 1982, pp. 6-21. 
22 Richard W. Nelson, "Economies of Scale vs. Regulation as 
Determinants of U.S. Banking Structure, BANK STRUCTURE AND 
COMPETITION, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May 1983. 
23 Benston, Hanaweck, and Humphrey, op cit. 
24Benston, Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey, op cit. 
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natural monopoly benefits to banks in business lending. 25 Thus, 
banking's pre-eminence as the major source of credit to small 
business borrowers does not arise from joint efficiencies 
associated with the production of commercial loans and other bank 
products. 
If consumers want to bank at two or more locations -- eg. at 
home and at work, or at the locations of two or more business 
offices of the same compani6-- branches may have a cost advantage in providing this service. Ready access to two or more 
locations is a type of "convenience" for which consumers have a 
positive demand and which branches can provide in greater variety 
and lower cost than unit banks. So long as consumers have a 
downward sloping demand for convenience, they may select branch 
banks over other banks, cet. par. 
The Impact of Unlimited Branching 
In a unit banking or limited branching state, a policy 
change to allow unlimited branching could result either in 1) 
consolidation and merger of existing banks or in 2) creation of 
new banking offices. The scale and scope arguments imply that 
the efficiency gain from allowing unit banks to merge and branch 
is limited. Gains would result from a greater physical presence 
of the bank, permitting potential growth in deposits that could 
be directed to certain branch offices. These offices, perhaps 
located in more rapidly developing rural communities, could then 
have a cost advantage over very small unit banks, particularly in 
the production of time deposits and real estate loans. This 
advantage appears to be sufficient for branches to locate in 
rural areas when possible. In statewide branching states, 66 
percent of the banks are headquartered in metropolitan counties; 
in unit banking and limited branching states, only 40 percent are 
headquartered in metropolitan counties. According to Milkove, 
"the difference suggests27hat branch banks have entered rural 
markets where they can. " . 
Branch banks may also compete with independent banks through 
new branch office starts, or de novo banking. Analysts argue 
that branching can make local banks more efficient even if a new 
branch does not actually enter and increase the number of local 
competitors. The simple authorization of branching is said to 
create a greater potential for entry and competition, thus 
25Ibid. 
26Richard W. Nelson,op cit. 
27oaniel Milkove, October 1985, op cit., p. 14. 
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encouraging existing banks to kigP prices low and service quality 
high to discourage new entries. 
II. ANALYSIS OF BANKING ACTIVITY IN AN EIGHT-STATE AREA 
In this study we describe the distribution of banking 
activity among metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas of Idaho, 
Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and 
Washington. Further, we attempt to test for any statistically 
verifiable difference in commercial credit in nonmetropolitan 
areas that is attributable to branch banking laws. 
Procedures 
Market area 
The geographic market for this study has been assume~ to be 
either the county or metropolitan statistical area (MSA). 9 This 
area should be large enough to contain the bulk of banking 
activity. The data used in this study are collected on a county-
wide basis and, when counties are part of an MSA, the data are 
aggregated. Rural counties and and MSAs are treated as the 
geographic market for banking services, following common 
practice. Hence, a significant share of bank lending is assumed 
to be for projects in the county or MSA where the bank is 
located. 
In rural areas, the county may understate the true market 
area. The Minneapolis Federal Reserve uses a study of bank 
market areas that contains roughly one-half as many bank market 
areas for Minnesota as the number of MSAs and nonmetropolitan 
counties. We did not adopt these same market areas because they 
use intra-county boundaries that make our data unacceptable. 
If the Federal Reserve's approach is more accurate, then 
non-metropolitan banks lend more heavily in neighboring counties 
than anticipated by our approach. However, the loans of small 
rural banks especially tend to be closely linked to local 
markets, and most rural banks are small. The average size bank 
in 97 percent of the nonmetropolitan counties in our study 
region, has assets of less than $100 million. For these 
28 Gary Whalen, "Competition and Bank Profitability: Recent 
Evidence," ECONOMIC COMMENTARY, Federal Reserve BAnk of Cleveland, 
Nov 1, 1986. 
29AnMSA is usually a multi-county re~ion with at least one 
city of at least 50, ooo people, at least 75% non-agricultural 
employment, and at least 15% of workers reside and work in the 
area. Statistical information is often gathered and reported by 
MSAs. 
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counties, the relative discrepancy between total commercial loans 
and lending to local commercial enterprises is not likely to be 
large. While our broader market definition is probably adequate 
for this study, it may be worthwhile to investigate commercial 
credit availability using an alternative market definition with 
other data. 
The data and variables 
Regional banking activity as measured by the level of 
commercial lending, depends on a number of factors. Among these 
are the number of banks and the concentration of banking 
activity. In addition, banking activity may be predicted on the 
basis of both internal factors (e.g., average size, number or 
concentration of banks) and external factors (e.g., per capita 
income, population density, deposits per capita). Finally, the 
distribution of banking activity may depend on the presence or 
absence of different branch banking laws. 
Measuring the spatial availability of commercial credit is 
difficult. While banks regularly report commercial lending, 
these figures do not tell where the loan proceeds are used or how 
difficult it is for the business to obtain the loan. A bank in a 
rural area could lend to commercial ventures in metropolitan 
areas; similarly rural businesses can get their credit from urban 
banks and other lenders. 
The analysis in this study concerns internal and external 
factors expected to give rise to differences in the spatial 
distribution of commercial loans made by banks. Internal factors 
relate to activity within the banking industry. For example, the 
size of banks may be an indicator of aggressive commercial 
lending activity, with smaller banks expected to show preference 
for safer lending options. The number or concentration of banks 
in a market area may also indicate aggressive behavior, with more 
concentrated markets less actively bidding for commercial 
borrowers. An alternative line of argument, however, holds that 
markets become concentrated because of aggressive and successful 
lending activity. 
Branch banking laws may influence the internal structure of 
banking. The impact of branching can be felt through 1) reduced 
costs of evaluating projects -- encouraging commercial lending in 
non-metropolitan areas -- and 2) reduced costs of transferring 
rural savings to outside activities -- potentially discouraging 
commercial lending in local areas. Thus, a priori it is not 
clear how branching may affect the supply of commercial credit in 
nonmetropolitan areas. 
External factors involve economic influences beyond the 
control of banks. For example the level of activity and 
diversity of the local economy, the local rate of economic and 
11 
population growth, deposits per capita, population density, 
access by local commercial ventures to markets, and other 
variables may all influence bank lending behavior. 
The distinction between internal and external factors is 
important for policy formation as well as for "explaining" the 
spatial aspects of commercial lending. If internal factors are 
primarily responsible for spatial credit differences, then policy 
can attempt to influence the structure of the banking industry so 
as to increase the flow of commercial credit. If external 
factors are primarily responsible, policy might be directed to 
general economic development of an area. If this economic 
development proceeds, supplies of commercial credit would 
increase as well. 
Internal variables: Concentration -- The Herfindahl Index is 
a measure of concentration of business activity, calculated by 
the sum of the square of firm market shares. Taking on values 
between O and 10,000, it attempts to show whether a few firms 
dominate a relatively large share of total activity among similar 
businesses in the local market. Values less than 1,000 are 
considered to be unconcentrated, moderate concentration betwee~0 
1,000 and 1,800 and highly concentrated for values over 1,800. 
High levels of concentration in a given market area might 
indicate less competitive pressure on the banks in that area. 
Herfindahl indices were calculated for all MSAs and counties 
in the eight state region. They are reported in Appendix B. In 
a branch banking state we would expect greater concentration 
levels than in non-branching or limited branching states because 
two or more branches in a single area are part of the same bank. 
Internal variables: Branch Share of deposits -- Another 
factor that may affect local banking activity is the economic 
presence established by branch banks in nonmetropolitan areas. 
As is argued in section I above, branches are believed to have 
entered rural markets where possible, to take advantage of 
competitive, scale, or other opportunities. The branch share of 
deposits attempts to measure the extent of the branching 
"presence" in an area. 
The metropolitan-nonmetropolitan distribution of commercial 
credit, a subset of all banking activities, should depend 
primarily on spatial differences in loan profitability. In the 
analysis in this study, we expect to see more commercial credit 
in areas where a banker would perceive ) ess risk of def~.ul t, i.e. 
30u.s. Department of Justice "1984 Merger Guidelines", 
Memorandum of June 14, 1984. 
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presumably in more diversified areas and areas with growing 
commercial opportunities. However, commercial credit may be more 
available in all areas if lending institutions have better risk 
assessment tools. If, for example, branch banks have lower 
internal costs for assessing commercial projects, branching is 
expected to result in a larger share of commercial loans. 
Share of deposits by branches was calculated on a county-
wide (or MSA-wide) basis, using data from Data Book - Operating 
Banks and Branches, as well as other public information collected 
by the FDIC. It is the proportion of deposits held by branches 
or branch offices to total deposits in the area. No attempt is 
made to distinguish between a branch office and the branch 
headquarters in calculating this ratio. 
If there is more commercial credit in branching states, it 
is not necessarily true that there is also a larger share of 
branch deposits. Information on branch deposits is available by 
county; all other information for the branches is collected only 
at the headquarters. Therefore, the amount of commercial credit 
provided by branches in each rural county is unknown. Further, 
the amount of commercial credit in a headquarters county or MSA 
may be overstated. While the bias in the branch-share-of-deposit 
variable is a potential problem, it nevertheless is the only 
variable that measures local branching activity. 
The data used in this study are described below according to 
1) dependent and internal variables and 2) external variables. 
The data have been grouped by county or MSA within a state. 
Dependent Variables -- The dependent variables reflect the 
relative amount of commercial lending by banks. Several choices 
of da;i are available, inc!~ding Commercial and Industri~! 
Loans ,Agricultural loans ,and Total Loans and Leases. These 
data can be combined to give the dependent variables: 
* commercial and industrial as a percent of total loans and 
leases, and 
* commercial and industrial plus agricultural as a percent of 
total loans and leases in nonmetropolitan areas. 
In these data, all loans and other assets of branches are 
reported only for headquarters offices. Loans made by 
nonmetropolitan branches, therefore, are reported in the data for 
31RcoN,1766, line 4, Schedule RC-C, of the Consolidated Report 
of Income, FDIC, for June 30, 1987 and June·,30, 1984. 
32Ibid., RCON 1590. 
33Ibid., RCON 2122. 
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the headquarters bank that often is located in a metropolitan 
area. The value of the dependent variable, then, is the ratio of 
commercial lending to total lending for unit banks or headquarter 
banks in the county or MSA. 
Internal variables - The non-policy internal explanatory 
variables are generated from data about the structure and 
internal operation of the banking industry. The data collected 
by county (MSA) and state include: 
* total liabilities, 
* total non-transaction accounts, 
* total transaction accounts, 
* total net income, 
* total assets, 
* total demand deposits, 
* total loans to depository institutions, 34 
* deposits of each unit bank and branch b~gk office, and 
* total number of banks and bank offices. 
The internal impact of statewide branching laws is treated 
as a dummy variable. Branching laws are different in each state 
and have changed over time. A state is counted as allowing 
branching if statewide branching is prevalent (Idaho, Oregon, 
South Dakota and Washington in 1987), and as not allowing 
branching if unit banking is prevalent or bra~ghing is limited 
(Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Montana). Data are grouped 
by MSAs and by counties. Because "limited branching" often means 
branching is allowed within a small geographic area or an MSA, 
our division of states by branching-allowed is reasonable. To 
the extent that limited branching means some branching across 
county or MSA lines, our division is incomplete. 
A separate variable is used to show the economic presence or 
potential influence of individual branches in each market area. 
This variable is the share of total deposits held by branches in 
nonmetropolitan counties. 
34 Ibid., item RCON 2948 (liabilities), RCON 2385 (non-
transaction accounts), RCON 2215 (transaction accounts), RCON 2170 
(assets), RCON 2210 (demand deposits), RIAD 4340 (net income), and 
RCON 1489 (loans to depository institutions). 
35 FDIC, OPERATING BANKS AND BRANCHES: DATA BOOK, Summary of 
Deposits in All Insured Commercial and Savings Banks and Domestic 
Brant.;i~es of Foreign Banks, June 30, 1987 and 1984, for number of 
banks aad banking offices in each county and total deposits for 
each bank and office. 
36 Data from the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Donna 
Y. James, Assistant Director, Washington, D.C., July 1988. 
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External variables - The data used to represent external 
conditions include population (1986), population growth (1980-
86), population density (persons per square mile, 1986), the 
number of households, dis~9sable income, and retail sales, all 
grouped by county or MSA. A d~l variable indicates whether 
each county is farming dependent. Another dummy variable shows 
if a major U.S. highway or interstate runs through the county. 
Also, slope dummy variables are used to capture the effect of 
farm dependency on some of the aforementioned variables: density, 
retail .sales per capita, population growth, savings, average 
assets, and loans to depository institutions. 
The model 
We want to show that banking activity (as measured by 
commercial credit) varies across regions due to both internal and 
external factors. To show banking activity, we use the ata set 
in two ways. First, we describe the spatial distribution of bank 
activity. Concentration ratios are computed, sorted and 
assembled in Table B. Also, branch share of deposit by county by 
state is similarly assembled. From these measures, some idea of 
the industry structure can be formed. Second, we attempt to 
analyze the spatial distribution of bank activity thruough 
regression analysis. From this step came a better understanding 
of the model and its composition. 
Estimation is done using OLS regression methods to show the 
relationship between variations in the rate of commercial loans 
by units and branch headquarters occurring in non-metropolitan 
counties and the internal and external variables identified 
above. The rate of commercial lending is expected to be 
positively related to external variables -- population growth, 
population density, disposable income per capita, and retail 
sales per capita. Commercial lending probably is negatively 
related to farming dependency; however if agriculture is viewed 
as a rural "business" and agricultural lending is joined with 
commercial lending, farming dependency should be positively 
related. 
The expected relationship between the rate of commercial 
lending and the internal variables is less uniform. A positive 
37 survey of Buying Power Data Service, SALES AND MARKETING 
MANAGEMENT MAGAZINE, 1987 and 1984. 
38Farming contributed a weighted annual average of 20 percent 
or more to total labor and proprietor income over the five-year 
period from 1975 to 1979. Lloyd D. Bender et al, THE DIVERSE 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF NONMETROPOLITAN AMERICA, USDA, 
Economic Research Service, Rural Development Research Report No. 
49, September 1985, Figure 1, p. 4. 
15 
relationship is expected between average bank size and commercial 
lending, along with a negative relationship between loans to 
depository institutions and commercial lending. Smaller banks 
are believed to look for uses of their assets that are safer 
(including loans to other depositories) than commercial lending. 
While the theoretical argument about concentration or 
profitability and lending is not settled, the more widely 
accepted view is that more concentrated or profitable bank 
markets result from aggressive lending· and are, therefore, 
positively related to commercial lending. The level of savings 
in rural banks could lead either to relatively more commercial 
lending (because long-term deposits imply more stable reserves 
and less risky lending for the bank) or relatively less 
commercial lending (because the bank has a greater incentive to 
send funds outside the market area to earn higher rates of return 
than are available locally). 
The coefficient on the branch banking dummy variable may be 
negative or positive. The sign of the variable will depend on 
the relative strength of two possible results from branching. 
First, the sign could be negative if branching banks bid 
commercial projects away from local units, reducing the total 
commercial lending by units and the share of commercial loans in 
their portfolios. Second, branching law may be positively 
related to the share of commercial lending by units either (A) by 
stimulating more total competition and lending in the local 
market or (B) by causing branches to pull out of nonmetropolitan 
commercial lending, leaving a larger portion for unit banks. 
If the sign on the branching law variable is positive, then 
the variable for the economic share of individual branches can 
suggest whether (A) or (B) is the better explanation and why. If 
the sign on the branching share variable is negative and 
significant, then explanation (A) is more plausible -- branch 
laws stimulate local lending competition so that banks tend to 
make more commercial loans; at the same time, branches bid some 
commercial customers away from units. If the branching share 
variable has a positive sign, this reinforces the view that 
branches yield their commercial lending opportunities to local 
unit banks. 
Results --
The following discussion is divided into two parts; the 
first is the results of the descriptive study showing 
concentration in rural ~arkets, the second is the results of the 
regression study supporting the hypothesis that branching laws 
may contribute to the uvailability of commercial credit in rural 
areas. 
The eight states in our study include 409 nonmetropolitan 
counties (MSA numbers less than 550) and 62 additional counties 
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that comprise 31 separate metropolitan statistical areas. 
nonmetropolitan counties, most have fewer than 7 banks or 
offices and 15 is the largest number of banks in any 




When banking activity is measured by deposits and the local 
market is defined as the county, the Herfindahl Index shows that 
only two nonmetropolitan counties are unconcentrated in the 8 
state area. Jgese are Renville County, Minnesota and Benton 
County, Iowa. Twenty-one additional nonmetropolitan counties in 
Minnesota are moderately concentrated, along with twenty-two in 
Iowa, one in Montana, one in Oregon, and one in South Dakota. 
All other nonmetropolitan counties are highly concentrated, 
indicating that relatively few banks in each county command 
relatively large shares of total bank deposits. This result may 
be due to either sparse population (i.e., the county cannot 
support more than a few banks) or from an anti-competitive 
climate. 
Mahy of the metropolitan statistical areas also are 
concentrated by deposits, including Boise in Idaho; Cedar Rapids, 
Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, Dubuque, Iowa City, Sioux City in 
Iowa (and adjoining states for some MSAs); Great Falls in 
Montana; Bismarck and Grand Forks in North Dakota; Eugene-
Springfield and Medford in Oregon; Rapid City and Sioux Falls in 
South Dakota; and Vancouver, Olympia, and Tacoma in Washington. 
Four states have moderately concentrated MSAs; Des Moines 
and Waterloo-Cedar Falls in Iowa, Duluth-Superior in Minnesota, 
Billings in Montana, Portland and Salem in Oregon, and 
Bellingham, Bremerton, Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, Seattle, 
Spokane, and Yakima in Washington. Only three MSAs have 
Herfindahl Indices indicating unconcentrated markets -- Fargo-
Moorhead, st. Cloud, and Minneapolis-st. Paul in Minnesota. 
These data, along with the number of banks in each county and a 
definition of the Herfindahl Index, are contained in Appendix B. 
If the geographic market area is defined by county (or MSA), 
the Herfindahl indices show that in most nonmetropolitan (and 
metropolitan) counties, relatively few banks could exercise a 
large share of market power. In reality, however, the market 
area is probably larger, particularly in rural communities, since 
banking activity (deposits and lending) is probably not confined 
to the county. Presumably a smaller Herfindahl would result, 
suggesting less concentration than measured in Appendix B. 
39HydeCounty, SD shows no deposits from one bank for this 
year, with Herfindahl of o. 
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To the extent that rural markets actually are less 
competitive due to high market concentration, there could be some 
impact on the level of commercial lending. However, competition 
may not be diminished and there may be little or no impact on 
commercial lending, due to the potential for entry by new banks 
or banking offices. That is, the possibility of entry should 
reduce the threat of "monopoly" power, even if new competitors 
never actually enter the market. 
Branch Share of deposits 
The percentage of total deposits attributable to deposits in 
branches is reported in Appendix C for each county in six states. 
In the unlimited branching states of South Dakota, Oregon, and 
Washington these shares are generally larger than for North 
Dakota, Minnesota, and Montana. (Iowa and Idaho are not included 
in these data.) The share of deposits held by branches is the 
only available data to describe banking activity by location; 
data are available on deposits per bank or banking office by 
location. No regularly collected data are available on lending 
and other activities of individual branches at different 
locations; these data are recorded at the 128ation of the 
headquarter•s office of the branching firm. 
Regression summary 
Many regressions were tried using the two dependent 
variables in the two regional designations (MSAs vs. other 
areas). Some variables were eliminated from these runs. This 
was done when both 
1. the t-statistics were insignificant at the 95% level 
and 
2. the remaining variables produced virtually the same 
model after the insignificant variable was dropped. 
In light of the possibility of an omitted variable bias, the 
final regressions may overstate the true relationships between 
the variables. However, the regression exercise is useful in 
that it provides insight into the relative strengths and 
interplay between the variables. 
The presence of statewide branch banking is positively 
associated with a greater share of commercial loans in the 
equation for each of three dependent variables --
40some branching is allowed in Minnesota and North Dakota, 
giving rise to branch share figures in some counties. Montana is 
the only state with prevalent unit banking: only one bank with one 
branch exists in the state. 
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1) the share of commercial-industrial loans ( hereafter 
referred to as commercial) in total loans and leases by unit 
and branch headquarters banks in nonmetropolitan counties, 
2) the share of commercial loans in metropolitan areas, and 
3) the share of commercial-plus-agricultural loans in 
nonmetropolitan areas. 
Further, the percent of all deposits held by branches in 
nonmetropolitan counties of six states is negatively associated 
with number 3) above. These findings suggest that branching 
increases competitive lending activity among local banks, both 
units and branches. 
The results of the four equations are shown in Table 2. 
Table 3 identifies each variable used. A summary of descriptive 
information on the variables is contained in Appendix D. 
BRANCH LAW is a dummy variable bearing the value 1 in 
counties and MSAs of states with unlimited branching. In Table 
2, equations III and IV for commercial-plus-agriculture in 
nonmetropolitan areas, BRANCH LAW is significant beyond the 95 
percent level. In the regression equations for commercial only, 
the t-statistic for BRANCH LAW is less significant at the 90 
percent or better level. BRANCH SHARE, included in regression 
equation IV, shows the percentage of all deposits made to 
branches in nonmetropolitan counties. The t-ratio on BRANCH 
SHARE is significant at the 90 percent or better level. 
The equations account for different percenta~es of the 
variation in the dependent variables. Adjusted R values are 
13.6% (commercial, nonmetropolitan), 18.0% (commercial, 
metropolitan), 34.1% (commercial-plus-agriculture, 
nonmetropolitan), and 45.1% (commercial-plus-agriculture, 
nonmetropolitan in 6 states) •. In each case the F statistic is 
strong and rejects the hypothesis that the equation has zero 
explanatory power. 
The most promising regression model is equation IV, 
Commercial-plus-Agricultural Loans, Nonmetropolitan Areas, 6 
States. In this model, BRANCH LAW increases the share of 
commercial-plus-agriculture loans for local unit banks while the 
relative economic presence of local branches (BRANCH SHARE) is 
seen to soften somewhat the effect of branching laws. The result 
is consistent with the argument made earlier that unlimited 
branching stimulates competition and business lending in local 
nonmetropolitan areas; local branches draw some of this increase 
in local activity away from local unit banks. Equation IV also 
reports statistical significance for SAVINGS, an internal 
variable, and for two external variables, DENSITY and FARM. 
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SAVINGS is the only internal variable that shows up as 
significant in all four equations. This tends to confirm the 
argument that when banks have more stable deposits, they are more 
willing to make commercial loans that can involve higher risk and 
longer time commitments than some other loans. The magnitude and 
direction of the coefficient for SAVINGS are roughly equal for 
equations II, III, and IV, nonmetropolitan areas (in commercial-
plus-agricultural loans) and metropolitan areas (in commercial 
loans). When only commercial loans are considered in 
nonmetropolitan areas, however, the coefficient for savings 
becomes much smaller. Additionally, FMxSAVINGS is significant 
and negative. One possible explanation is that in farm-dependent 
counties, stable deposits encourage agricultural loans at the 
expense of commercial loans. It may also be that, given the 
seasonal nature of farm income, banks in agricultural areas view 
savings as less stable than banks in other areas. On balance, 
SAVINGS has a positive effect although this impact is dampened in 
farm dependent counties. 
Several external variables may play a role in the share of 
commercial lending. These include access to highways (ROADS), 
farm-dependency (FARM), population density (DENSITY), and retail 
sales per capita (RETAIL). In equation I, rural counties with a 
major highway show more commercial lending, reflecting the 
significance of access to markets -- perhaps commercial proposals 
are easier and cheaper for unit banks to evaluate if access to 
markets for commercial activity is relatively easy. In III and 
IV, farm-dependent nonmetropolitan counties have more commercial-
plus-agriculture lending than nonfarm-dependent counties. This 
supports the argument that rural banks lend in local (county) 
markets. Population density in farm counties enters differently 
for commercial than for commercial-plus-agriculture loan shares. 
Higher density in farm counties is associated with more 
commercial lending by unit banks in equation I, as expected. In 
III and IV, however, density for all nonmetropolitan counties and 
for the subset of farm-dependent counties show up as negative for 
commercial-plus-agriculture lending. This may capture the effect 
of agricultural lending -- more dense population means relatively 
less agricultural activity and lending. In metropolitan areas, 
equation II, retail sales per capita are positively associated 
with the share of commercial lending, implying that MSAs with 




Laws permitting unlimited branching tend to increase the 
share of commercial lending by unit banks and branch headquarters 
in both nonmetropolitan and metropolitan markets. In each of 
four regression results in Table 2 above, branch banking makes a 
positive and significant contribution to the share of commercial 
loans. The fourth equation adds a variable to measure actual 
activity of branches in local markets; the results allow us to 
argue that local branches enhance local commercial-plus-
agricultural lending and possibly bid some commercial customers 
away from local unit banks. 
These results, of course, do not prove that branching will 
increase commercial loans in nonmetropolitan areas. Rather they 
imply that such has been the case in the past. If limited 
branching states convert to unlimited branching in the future, 
the results may not be the same as those of the past. However, 
the literature and the examination of data in this study together 
suggest that, in a conversion to unlimited branching, there is 
reason to watch for the following outcomes: 
* some very small unit banks may be taken over by more cost-
effective branches, 
* some other banks may become branches through mergers, 
especially in areas where relatively more deposits are 
available, 
* nonmetropolitan branches and unit banks may be somewhat more 
willing to consider local commercial lending opportunities, 
and 
* the possibility of entry by branches may encourage more 
efficiency or more lending activity in nonmetropolitan 
areas, even if entry by branches does not occur. 
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TABLE 1 
CLASSIFICATION OF STATES ACCORDING TO TYPjlS OF 




























































This classification is made for the purpose of discussing changes 
in the banking structure and is based on the type of banking 
seemingly prevalent in each state and not necessarily on the 
current status of legal provisions. 
1 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Donna Y. James 
Assistant Director, Washington D.C., July 1988. 
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TABLE 2 : BEST REGRESSION RESULTS TO EXPLAIN THE SHARE OF 
COMMERCIAL LENDING IN TOTAL LOANS AND LEASES 
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AdjR2 = 45 .1% F = 43. 92 
n = 261 
* significant at the 95% confidence level or better. 
** significant at the 90% confidence level or better. 
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TABLE 3: VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION EQUATIONS IN TABLE 2 
Variable MEANS: Metro Nonmetro Overall 
COMMERCIAL LOANS 1 .2724 .2100 .2148 
COMMERCIAL-PLUS 
-AGRICULTURE LOANS 2 
.5270 
SAVINGS 3 .5910 .6925 .6846 
DENSITY4 171.4 21.7 33.9 
RETAIL5 5674 4658 4742 
DUMMY VARIABLES: BRANCH LAW6 FARM7 ROADS 8 
SLOPE VARIABLES: FMxSAVINGS9 FMxDENSITYlO 
1 commercial and Industrial Loans/ Total Loans and Leases in 
a SMSA or a nonmetropolitan county. 
2 Commercial and Industrial plus Agricultural Loans/ Total 
Loans and Leases in each nonmetropolitan county. 
3 Total Nontransactions Accounts/ Total Liabilities in each 
SMSA and nonmetropolitan county. 
4 Population per square mile in each SMSA and nonmetropolitan 
county. 
5 Retail Sales/ Population in each SMSA and nonmetropolitan 
county. 
6 A dummy variable with the value of 1 for counties and SMSAs 
in states with unlimited branching. 
7 A dummy variable with the value of 1 for farm-dependent 
counties in nonmetropolitan areas. 
8 A dummy variable with the value of l for an SMSA or 
nonmetropolitan county containing a major U.S. ~ighway. 
9 The value of SAVINGS in FARM (farm-dependent nonmetropolitan 
counties). 




(From conference of state Bank supervisors, Donna Y. James, 
Assistant Director, Washington n.c., July 1988.) 
Idaho 
Iowa 
GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON BRANCHING 
Statewide Branching. 
Branching specifically prohibited; however, banks may 
operate up to 5 full-service facilities within the 
municipal corporation or urban complex in which the 
principal office is located if the municipal 
corporation or urban complex has a population of over 
200,000; 4 such facilities if the population is over 
100,000 but less than 200,000; and 3 such facilities if 
the population is less than 100,000. Full service 
office facilities are also permitted outside the 
municipal corporation or urban complex in which the 
principal office is located provided they are in the 
same county or in a contiguous county. 
Minnesota Limited Branching. Full service detached facilities 
are permitted. Any bank, savings banks, and trust 
company is permitted five detached facilities. They 
may be located anywhere in the municipality in which 
the principal office is located; or within 100 miles of 
its principal office, but within another municipality. 
A bank may also have 1 detached drive-in facility 
within 1,500 feet of its main office or 1 of its 
detached facilities. If the municipality location, 
other than that which contains the principal office, 
has population of 10,000 or less based upon the last 
federal census, existing banks must provide consent in 
writing to the establishment of the facility. 8/1/87 
amendments allow banks to operate unlimited number of 
branches in Minneapolis-st. Paul. No limitations on 
mergers and consolidations. 
Montana Branching prohibited; a facility is permitted provided 
it is located within 1000 feet of a bank's principal 
office, and is not closer than 200 feet to a facility 
of another bank nor 300 feet to a facility of another 
bank nor 300 feet to another bank's principal office. 
North Dakota 
Branching is prohibited. A bank may establish paying 
and receiving stations within the county in which its 
home office is located or in any adjoining county with 
a 35 mile radius, provided that no such station may be 
established in any city or town with an established 
banking institution located therein. Every bank under 
the supervision of the state banking board, and any 
Oregon 
national bank doing business in the state, may, upon 
compliance, maintain and operate separate and apart 
from its banking house one facility for drive-in and 
walk-up service, in addition to such service at its 
main banking house, and at its paying and receiving 
station, if any. 
The facility shall be within the corporate city limits 
of the main banking house or within three miles of such 
city but shall not be within the corporate limits of 
another city. 
One additional separate drive-in and walk-up facility 
may be maintained and operated not more than 1,500 feet 
from its main banking house by any bank that does not 






Appendix B - Herfindahl Indices 
Unconcentrated (HHI < 1000) 
MSA/County Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
101 955 IA Benton 13 
184 967 MN Renville 13 
357 0 SD Hyde 1 
2520 914 ND Cass 17 
MN Clay 10 
5120 748 MN Anoka 17 
MN Carver 11 
MN Chisago 8 
MN Dakota 25 
MN Hennepin 69 
MN Isanti 4 
MN Ramsey 35 
MN Scott 9 
MN Washingto 15 
MN Wright 14 
6980 530 MN Benton 5 
MN Sherburne 5 
MN Stearns 27 
Moderate concentration (1000 < HHI < 1800) 
MSA/County Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
14 1742 MT Flathead 10 
98 1781 IA Allamakee 6 
105 1393 IA Butler 8 
106 1435 IA Calhoun 8 
107 1546 IA Carroll 9 
113 1380 IA Clayton 9 
115 1664 IA Crawford 9 
122 1653 IA Fayette 9 
125 1776 IA Fremont 7 
126 1782 IA Greene 8 
127 1615 IA Grundy 7 
128 1735 IA Guthrie 7 
131 1689 IA Hardin 10 
132 1493 IA Harrison 9 
142 1355 IA Keokuk 9 
143 1449 IA Kossuth 10 
144 1396 IA Lee 8 
154 1760 IA Monona 9 
159 1485 IA Obrien 8 
162 1612 IA Plymouth 9 
167 1267 IA Sioux 12 
Moderate concentration (1000 < HHI < 1800) 
MSALCounty Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
169 1433 IA Tama 10 
174 1660 IA Washingto 9 
183 1283 MN Redwood 13 
188 1621 MN Sibley 7 
191 1731 MN Swift 7 
194 1780 MN Wabasha 7 
197 1323 MN Watonwan 9 
206 1096 MN otter Tai 15 
212 1619 MN Blue Eart 12 
213 1394 MN Brown 10 
219 1688 MN Crow Wing 11 
222 1063 MN Faribault 13 
223 1063 MN Fillmore 13 
224 1350 MN Freeborn 15 
225 1165 MN Goodhue 13 
226 1541 MN Grant 7 
227 1689 MN Houston 7 
238 1123 MN Le Seuer 10 
242 1580 MN Marshall 8 
243 1344 MN Martin 12 
244 1789 . MN McLeod 9 
245 1723 MN Meeker 8 
251 1566 MN Nobles 9 
317 1730 SD Turner 6 
363 1759 OR Lincoln 7 
860 1287 WA Whatcom 12 
880 1715 MT Yellowstone 14 
2120 1268 IA Dallas 7 
IA Polk 18 
IA Warren 4 
8920 1439 IA Black Hawk 8 
IA Bremer 9 
2240 1231 MN st. Louis 26 
6440 1548 OR Clackamas 10 
OR Multnomah 9 
OR Washington 9 
OR Yamhill 7 
7080 1633 OR Marion 11 
OR Polk 6 
1150 1457 WA Kitsap 12 
6740 1230 WA Be.nton 7 
WA Franklin 5 
Moderate concentration (1000 < HHI < 1800) 
MSA.:'.'.County Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
7600 1420 WA King 27 
WA Snohomish 16 
7840 1566 WA Spokane 11 
9260 1479 WA Yakima 9 
High concentration ( HHI > 1800) 
MSA.:'.'.County Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
1 5146 MT Beaverhead 2 
2 5469 MT Big Horn 2 
3 3417 MT Blaine 3 
4 10000 MT Broadwater 1 
5 3677 MT Carbon 3 
6 10000 MT Carter 1 
7 3728 MT Chouteau 3 
8 3876 MT Custer 3 
9 10000 MT Daniels 1 
10 3494 MT Dawson 4 
11 5104 MT Deer Lodge 2 
12 5001 MT Fallon 2 
13 4011 MT Fergus 4 
15 2420 MT Gallatin 9 
16 10000 MT Garfield 1 
17 5422 MT Glacier 2 
18 10000 MT Granite 1 
19 3573 MT Hill 4 
20 5214 MT Jefferson 2 
21 10000 MT Judith Basin 1 
22 2728 MT Lake 5 
23 3299 MT Lewis&Clark 6 
24 10000 MT Liberty 1 
25 7143 MT Lincoln 2 
26 3727 MT Madison 3 
27 10000 MT McCone 1 
28 10000 MT Meagher 1 
29 10000 MT Mineral 1 
30 2715 MT Missoula 8 
31 5129 MT Musselshead 2 
32 4180 MT Park 3 
33 6129 MT Phillips 2 
34 5937 MT Pondera 3 
35 10000 MT Powder River 1 
36 5000 MT Powell 2 
37 10000 MT Prairie 1 
38 2970 MT Ravalli 4 
39 3221 MT Richland 4 
High concentration ( HHI > 1800) 
MSALCounty Herfindahl State county Name County Total Banks 
40 2331 MT Roosevelt 5 
41 4371 MT Rosebud 4 
42 5003 MT Sanders 2 
43 5239 MT Sheridan 2 
44 3132 MT Silver Bow 5 
45 4066 MT Stillwater 3 
46 5986 MT sweet Grass 2 
47 3683 MT Teton 3 
48 5000 MT Toole 2 
49 10000 MT Treasure 1 
50 3792 MT Valley 4 
51 10000 MT Wheatland 1 
52 10000 MT Wilbaux 1 
53 8766 ID Adams 2 
54 2449 ID Bannock 7 
55 4085 ID Bear Lake 3 
56 4742 ID Benewah 3 
57 2504 ID Bingham 5 
58 4898 ID Blaine 3 
59 10000 ID Boise 1 
60 3441 ID Bonner 5 
61 2061 ID Bonneville 7 
62 4002 ID Boundary 3 
63 7565 ID Butte 2 
64 10000 ID Camas 1 
65 2973 ID Canyon 5 
66 6126 ID Caribou 2 
67 2363 ID cassia 6 
68 10000 ID Clark 1 
69 5722 ID Clearwater 2 
70 5049 ID Custer 2 
71 3592 ID Elmore 3 
72 4361 ID Franklin 3 
73 5269 ID Fremont 2 
74 4466 ID Gem 3 
75 2564 ID Gooding 5 
76 3426 ID Idaho 3 
77 4186 ID Jefferson 4 
78 3776 ID Jerome 3 
79 2646 ID Kootenai 5 
80 2899 ID Latah 5 
82 5929 ID Lewis 2 
83 6194 ID Lincoln 2 
84 3669 ID Madison 4 
85 3558 ID Minidoka 3 
86 2727 ID Nez Perce 6 
87 5294 ID Oneida 2 
88 8580 ID Owyhee 2 
89 2742 ID Payette 4 
90 4105 ID Power 3 
91 3587 ID Shoshone 3 
High concentration ( HHI > 1800) 
MSAL'.County Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
92 10000 ID Teton 1 
93 2791 ID Twin Falls 6 
94 5139 ID Valley 2 
95 3792 ID Washington 5 
96 2573 IA Adair 5 
97 7459 IA Adams 2 
99 5057 IA Appanoose 3 
100 3624 IA Audubon 3 
102 2837 IA Boone 4 
103 2334 IA Buchanan 8 
104 2225 IA Buena Vista 9 
108 2379 IA Cerro Gordo 9 
109 2722 IA Cherokee 7 
111 7943 IA Clarke 2 
112 1804 IA Clay 7 
114 1984 IA Clinton 9 
116 5311 IA Davis 3 
117 5434 IA Decatur 2 
118 1813 IA Delaware 7 
119 2228 IA Des Moines 6 
120 2109 IA Dickinson 5 
121 4106 IA Emmet 3 
123 3313 IA Floyd 4 
124 2826 IA Franklin 6 
129 3046 IA Hamilton 6 
130 2492 IA Hancock 6 
133 2862 IA Henry 7 
134 3305 IA Howard 5 
135 4632 IA Humboldt 3 
136 3593 IA Ida 4 
137 1828 IA Iowa 7 
138 2242 IA Jackson 8 
139 2093 IA Jasper 9 
140 3371 IA Jefferson 4 
141 4214 IA Jones 6 
145 2519 IA Louisa 5 
146 5407 IA Lucas 3 
147 2073 IA Lyon 6 
148 3398 IA Madison 3 
149 2972 IA Mahaska 5 
150 2148 IA Marion 6 
151 2593 IA Marshall 8 
152 3781 IA Mills 4 
153 2536 IA Mitchell 5 
155 6574 IA Monroe 3 
156 3207 IA Montgomery 4 
157 2909 IA Muscatine 6 
158 2096 IA Osceola 5 
160 2042 IA Page 5 
161 1991 IA Palo Alto 6 
163 1978 IA Pocahontas 6 
High concentration ( HHI > 1800) 
MSALCounty Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
164 2259 IA Poweshiek 7 
165 6282 IA Ringgold 3 
166 3057 IA Shelby 6 
168 1893 IA Story 12 
170 3390 IA Taylor 3 
171 4083 IA Union 4 
172 3198 IA Van Buren 4 
173 3832 IA Wapello 3 
175 3918 IA Wayne 3 
176 2879 IA Webster 6 
177 2608 IA Winnebago 6 
178 3177 IA Winneshiek 6 
179 3768 IA Worth 4 
180 1890 IA Wright 7 
181 2955 MN Aitkin 4 
182 4186 MN Red Lake 3 
185 1827 MN Rice 9 
186 2246 MN Rock 6 
187 3501 MN Roseau 4 
189 2576 MN Steele 8 
190 2931 MN Stevens 5 
192 2531 MN Todd 6 
193 4668 MN Traverse 3 
195 2342 MN Wadena 5 
196 2183 MN Waseca 6 
198 3409 MN Wilkin 5 
199 2139 MN Winona 10 
200 1862 MN Yellow Medicine 7 
201 2388 MN Pope 5 
202 1939 MN Polk 10 
203 3063 MN Pipestone 5 
204 1960 MN Pine 6 
205 4983 MN Pennington 3 
207 2945 MN Olmsted 7 
208 1811 MN Norman 7 
209 3060 MN Becker 8 
210 3710 MN Beltrami 5 
211 2329 MN Big Stone 5 
214 3686 MN Carlton 4 
215 2855 MN Cass 6 
216 3486 MN Clearwater 3 
217 10000 MN Cook 1 
218 1957 MN Cottonwood 6 
220 2285 MN Dodge 5 
221 2253 MN Douglas 10 
228 3844 MN Hubbard 4 
;,29 2347 MN Itasca 10 
230 2091 MN Jackson 7 
232 3875 MN Kanabec 3 
233 5247 MN Kittson 3 
234 4275 MN Koochiching 3 
High concentration ( HHI > 1800) 
MSALCounty Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
235 2463 MN Lac qui parle 5 
236 5469 MN Lake 2 
237 10000 MN Lake of the wood 1 
239 2589 MN Lincoln 4 
240 1997 MN Lyon 8 
241 5031 MN Mahnomen 2 
246 2788 MN Mille Lacs 6 
247 2053 MN Morrison 8 
248 2158 MN Mower 12 
249 1966 MN Murray 6 
250 2173 MN Nicollet 7 
252 6493 ND Renville 2 
253 2679 ND Richland 5 
254 3645 ND Roulette 3 
255 5489 ND Sargent 2 
256 5172 ND Sheridan 2 
257 10000 ND Sioux 1 
258 2463 ND Stark 6 
259 3890 ND Steele 3 
260 3095 ND Stutsman 7 
261 5189 ND Towner 2 
262 2149 ND Traill 6 
263 2695 ND Walsh 6 
264 2253 ND Ward 6 
265 3138 ND Wells 5 
266 3365 ND Williams 5 
267 3666 ND Ransom 3 
268 2908 ND Ramsey 6 
269 5231 ND Pierce 2 
270 2159 ND Pembina 7 
271 10000 ND Oliver 1 
272 2038 ND Nelson 6 
273 3373 ND Mountrail 3 
274 3458 ND Morton 6 
275 5094 ND Adams 2 
276 2371 ND Barnes 6 
277 3399 ND Benson 3 
278 10000 ND Billings 1 
279 4056 ND Bottineau 5 
280 5687 ND Bowman 2 
281 4265 ND Burke 3 
282 3722 ND cavalier 3 
283 5004 ND Dickey 2 
284 6715 ND Divide 2 
285 5141 ND Dunn 2 
286 7178 ND Eddy 2 
287 4022 ND Emmons 3 
288 5843 ND Foster 2 
289 7079 ND Golden Valley 2 
290 3385 ND Grant 3 
291 3395 ND Griggs 3 
High concentration ( HHI > 1800) 
MSALCounty Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
292 3945 ND Hettinger 3 
293 5160 ND Kidder 2 
294 2704 ND LaMoure 5 
295 3436 ND Logan 4 
296 3251 ND McHenry 4 
297 5462' ND McIntosh 2 
298 6423 ND McKenzie 2 
299 2011 ND McLean 8 
300 4310 ND Mercer 3 
301 5154 SD Aurora 2 
302 3432 SD Beadle 5 
303 10000 SD Bennett 1 
304 2732 SD BonHomme 5 
306 2931 SD Brown 8 
307 6248 SD Moody 2 
308 5609 SD Perkins 2 
309 5072 SD Potter 2 
310 2517 SD Roberts 5 
311 5121 SD Sanborn 2 
312 2068 SD Spink 8 
313 10000 SD Stanley 1 
314 5118 SD Sully 2 
315 10000 SD Todd 1 
316 3839 SD Tripp 3 
318 3604 SD Union 3 
319 3596 SD Walworth 3 
320 2857 SD Yankton 5 
321 10000 SD Ziebach 1 
322 4148 SD Miner 3 
323 10000 SD Mellette 1 
324 4104 SD Meade 3 
325 2826 SD Marshall 4 
326 5557 SD McPherson 2 
327 3450 SD McCook 4 
328 5242 SD Lyman 2 
329 2576 SD Lincoln 5 
330 5180 SD Lawrence 4 
331 5060 SD Brule 2 
332 3520 SD Butte 4 
333 10000 SD Campbell 1 
334 2962 SD Charles Mix 5 
335 5020 SD Clark 3 
336 3485 SD Clay 5 
337 4488 SD Codington 4 
338 5030 SD Corson 2 
339 8:.,32 SD Custer 2 
340 4274 SD Davison 3 
341 3980 SD Day 4 
342 6372 SD Deuel 2 
343 5118 SD Dewey 2 
344 5122 SD Douglas 2 
High concentration ( HHI > 1800) 
MSAi:'.'.'.County Herfindahl State County Name County Total Banks 
345 2876 SD Edmunds 4 
346 4042 SD Fall River 3 
347 5642 SD Faulk 2 
348 4396 SD Grant 3 
349 5130 SD Gregory 2 
350 8304 SD Haakon 2 
351 2591 SD Hamlin 4 
352 10000 SD Hand 2 
353 3507 SD Hanson 3 
354 10000 SD Harding 1 
355 3029 SD Hughes 4 
356 2329 SD Hutchinson 6 
358 10000 SD Jackson 1 
359 10000 SD Jerauld 1 
360 4188 SD Jones 3 
361 2515 SD Kingsbury 5 
362 3980 SD Lake 5 
364 3203 OR Linn 5 
365 4848 OR Malheur 3 
366 3932 OR Morrow 3 
367 10000 OR Sherman 1 
368 4281 OR Tillamook 4 
369 2283 OR Umatilla 5 
370 4390 OR Union 3 
371 3799 OR Wallowa 3 
372 3640 OR Wasco 4 
373 10000 OR Wheeler 1 
374 4861 OR Baker 3 
375 2580 OR Benton 6 
376 3638 OR Clatsop 3 
377 3503 OR Columbia 5 
378 2377 OR Coos 5 
379 3832 OR Crook 4 
380 3180 OR Curry 4 
381 2840 OR Deschutes 7 
382 2221 OR Douglas 6 
383 5128 OR Gilliam 2 
384 5109 OR Grant 2 
385 6800 OR Harney 2 
386 4085 OR Hood River 3 
387 4263 OR Jefferson 3 
388 2081 OR Josephine 8 
389 3164 OR Klamath 4 
390 5357 OR Lake 2 
391 7329 WA San Juan 2 
392 2079 WA Skagit 9 
393· 10000 WA Skamania 1 
394 3479 WA Stevens 3 
395 10000 WA Wahkiakum 1 
396 3161 WA Walla Walla 7 
397 1900 WA Whitman 11 
High concentration ( HHI > 1800) 
MSAl'.County: Herfindahl state County Name countv Total Banks 
398 4527 WA Pend Oreille 3 
399 2654 WA Pacific 4 
400 2328 WA Adams 6 
401 5146 WA Asotin 2 
402 2450 WA Chelan 6 
403 3599 WA Clallam 4 
404 5352 WA Columbia 2 
405 1961 WA Cowlitz 7 
406 2441 WA Douglas 6 
407 10000 WA Ferry 1 
408 5001 WA Garfield 2 
409 1941 WA Grant 7 
410 1862 WA Grays Harbor 9 
411 2635 WA Island 5 
412 5455 WA Jefferson 2 
413 2424 WA Kittitas 5 
414 4887 WA Klickitat 3 
415 2071 WA Lewis 8 
416 2299 WA Lincoln 5 
417 3777 WA Mason 5 
418 2424 WA Okanogan 5 
1080 3187 ID Ada 7 
1360 2049 IA Linn 18 
1960 3884 IA Scott 13 
2200 2212 IA Dubuque 10 
3500 2585 IA Johnson 8 
5920 2395 IA Pottawatamie 10 
7720 1913 IA Woodbury 16 
3040 2134 MT Cascade 9 
1010 3148 ND Burleigh 6 
2985 2336 ND Grand Forks 8 
2400 2494 OR Lane 13 
4890 2527 OR Jackson 8 
6660 3299 SD Pennington 7 
7760 3543 SD Minnehaha 12 
5910 2245 WA Thurston 9 
8200 2083 WA Pierce 18 
8725 2222 WA Clark 7 
Appendix C - Branch share of total deposits for 6 states 
County Branch share 
State county Msa number Total deposit Total deposit 
SD Aurora 301 46202 0 
SD Beadle 302 205730 0.530544 
SD Bennett 303 14203 0 
SD BonHomme 304 64977 0.186604 
SD Brookins 305 206833 0.137478 
SD Brown 306 372319 0.907885 
SD Brule 331 85178 0.445009 
SD Butte 332 95611 0.867693 
SD Campbell 333 21260 0 
SD Charles Mix 334 104479 0.380344 
SD Clark 335 49258 1 
SD Clay 336 88959 1 
SD Codington 337 184549 1 
SD Corson 338 19932 0.460967 
SD Custer 339 20149 0.076778 
SD Davison 340 186209 0.497269 
SD Day 341 66770 0.111981 
SD Deuel 342 43144 0 
SD Dewey 343 26203 0 
SD Douglas 344 36536 1 
SD Edmunds 345 44669 0 
SD Fall River 346 49913 1 
SD Faulk 347 24898 0 
SD Grant 348 88424 0.393105 
SD Gregory 349 83478 1 
SD Haakon 350 47426 0.093577 
SD Hamlin 351 49092 0.216776 
SD Hand 352 30142 0 
SD Hanson 353 37212 0.731860 
SD Harding 354 15537 0 
SD Hughes 355 139513 0.695956 
SD Hutchinson 356 150254 0.091065 
SD Hyde 357 0 0 
SD Jerauld 359 37336 1 
SD Jones 360 21174 0.668036 
SD Kingsbury 361 79555 0.355401 
SD Lake 362 100516 1 
SD Lawrence 330 144636 0.897127 
SD Lincoln 329 79745 0.058787 
SD Marshall 325 42906 0.396471 
SD McCook 327 57001 0.296363 
SD McPherson 326 33225 0 
SD Meade 324 87123 0.312787 
SD Miner 322 25861 0.434089 
SD Minnehaha 7760 2969503 0.210896 
SD Moody 307 44732 0.250223 
SD Pennington 6660 438890 0.834070 
SD Perkins 308 79398 0.325436 
SD Potter 309 49096 0.560004 
County Branch share 
State County Msa number Total de:gosit Total de:gosit 
SD Roberts 310 83762 0.353955 
SD Sanborn 311 24713 0.422085 
SD Spink 312 116375 0.661868 
SD Stanley 313 11400 0 
SD Sully 314 22048 0.423031 
SD Tripp 316 102006 0.691449 
SD Turner 317 90083 0.484863 
SD Union 318 91040 0.230744 
SD Walworth 319 96559 0.605609 
SD Yankton 320 174305 0.469343 
SD Ziebach 321 14168 0 
OR Benton 375 238272 0.612371 
OR Clackamas 6440 875339 0.890323 
OR Clatsop 376 181769 0.796087 
OR Coos 378 321382 0.964661 
OR crook 379 75168 1 
OR Curry 380 100152 1 
OR Deschutes 381 346832 0.916247 
OR Douglas 382 478644 0.617254 
OR Gilliam 383 16639 1 
OR Hood River 386 87073 1 
OR Jackson 4890 585540 0.924756 
OR Jefferson 387 62524 0.830641 
OR Josephine 388 278559 0.905829 
OR Klamath 389 254300 0.827105 
OR Lane 2400 1082185 0.817460 
OR Lincoln 363 258735 0.333136 
OR Linn 364 358994 1 
OR Marion 7080 1271238 0.932751 
OR Multnomah 6440 4874368 0.947111 
OR Polk 7080 123486 0.852606 
OR Umatilla 369 305125 0.870046 
OR Union 370 100885 1 
OR Wallowa 371 48206 0.731693 
OR Wasco 372 158603 0.890128 
OR Washington 6440 1227013 0.921504 
OR Yamhill 6440 252058 0.913043 
WA Asotin 401 81400 0.585491 
WA Benton 6740 415892 0.966563 
WA Chelan 402 370946 0.965889 
WA Clallam 403 199549 0.868343 
WA Clark 8725 709351 0.836181 
WA Cowlitz 405 311702 0.894934 
WA Douglas 406 85255 1 
WA Franklin 6740 158745 0.829978 
WA Gr2.nt 409 276442 1 
WA Grays Harbor 410 301165 0.809436 
WA Island 411 137120 0.673424 
WA King 7600 14813020 0.974892 
WA Kitsap 1150 585159 0.708674 
WA Klickitat 414 103484 0.624627 
WA Lewis 415 303809 0.714774 
County Branch share 
State County Msa number Total de12osit Total de12osit 
WA Lincoln 416 147841 0.779066 
WA Mason 417 125124 0.829792 
WA Okanogan 418 192076 0.696297 
WA Pacific 399 115303 0.720362 
WA Pend Oreille 398 43590 0.756526 
WA Pierce 8200 2803029 0.916609 
WA San Juan 391 71348 0 
WA Skagit 392 435118 0.600211 
WA Snohomish 7600 1660494 0.879649 
WA Spokane 7840 2259939 0.723611 
WA Stevens 394 127123 1 
WA Thurston 5910 511104 0.956550 
WA Walla Walla 396 307844 0.405507 
WA Whatcom 860 890316 0.760060 
WA Whitman 397 287707 0.827800 
WA Yakima 9260 848000 0.881079 
ND Adams 275 36848 0 
ND Barnes 276 144435 0.308429 
ND Benson 277 38817 0.650436 
ND Bottineau 279 126052 0.617776 
ND Bowman 280 76254 0 
ND Burke 281 40393 0.164285 
ND Burleigh 1010 440835 0 
ND Cass 2520 776084 0.013568 
ND Cavalier 282 89071 0.418295 
ND Dickey 283 59930 0 
ND Divide 284 52376 0.207175 
ND Dunn 285 27094 0 
ND Eddy 286 19561 0 
ND Emmons 287 69893 0 
ND Foster 288 61052 1 
ND Golden Valley 289 34913 0.822387 
ND Grand Forks 2985 461634 0.014916 
ND Grant 290 29536 0.326110 
ND Griggs 291 56538 0 
ND Hettinger 292 45043 0 
ND Kidder 293 37700 0.589469 
ND LaMoure 294 55025 0.223661 
ND Logan 295 53288 0.275465 
ND McHenry 296 56836 0.673323 
ND McIntosh 297 58402 0 
ND McKenzie 298 65182 0 
ND McLean 299 116304 0.211910 
ND Mercer 300 91094 0 
ND Morton 274 182079 0.282981 
ND Mountrail 273 84251 0.283272 
ND Nelson 272 88722 0.086370 
ND Oliver 271 9528 0 
ND Pembina 270 121685 0.056892 
ND Pierce 269 68879 0 
ND Ramsey 268 134003 0.463914 
County Branch share 
State County Msa number Total de:gosit Total de:gosit 
ND Ransom 267 71967 0 
ND Renville 252 20990 0.226822 
ND Richland 253 152358 0 
ND Roulette 254 66830 0 
ND Sargent 255 47267 0 
ND Sheridan 256 26034 1 
ND stark 258 177067 0.028480 
ND Steele 259 40063 0.191398 
ND Stutsman 260 223554 0.023587 
ND Towner 261 51800 0 
ND Traill 262 119210 0.169960 
ND Walsh 263 184045 0.753310 
ND Ward 264 438877 0.378727 
ND Wells 265 95153 0.082393 
ND Williams 266 264024 0 
MN Aitkin 181 74117 0.489523 
MN Anoka 5120 608390 0.350712 
MN Becker 209 158077 0.090740 
MN Beltrami 210 227310 0.237877 
MN Benton 6980 160642 0.043755 
MN Big Stone 211 79218 0 
MN Blue Earth 212 477301 0.112140 
MN Brown 213 340630 0.096042 
MN Carlton 214 121751 0.017100 
MN carver -5120 292633 0.198337 
MN Cass 215 100879 0.632579 
MN Chippewa 500 181192 0 
MN Chisago 5120 141856 0.101137 
MN Clay 2520 283316 0.008178 
MN Clearwater 216 53835 0 
MN Cook 217 20110 0 
MN Cottonwood 218 144052 0.164107 
MN Crow Wing 219 344088 0.146392 
MN Dakota 5120 912300 0.103233 
MN Dodge 220 107568 0 
MN Douglas 221 259187 0.012041 
MN Faribault 222 205256 0 
MN Fillmore 223 236110 0.116674 
MN Freeborn 224 243140 0 
MN Goodhue 225 348826 0.227738 
MN Grant 226 79391 0.181922 
MN Hennepin 5120 13955087 0.165710 
MN Houston 227 133564 0 
MN Hubbard 228 91362 0.055767 
MN Isanti 5120 137800 0.335406 
MN Itasca 221 253110 0.289091 
MN Jackson 230 117065 0.245564 
MN Kanabec 232 88458 0.143469 
MN Kandiyohi 231 335483 0 
MN Kittson 233 59288 0.075006 
MN Koochiching 234 102779 0 
MN Lac qui parle 235 90250 0 
County Branch share 
State County Msa number Total de12osit Total de12osit 
MN Lake 236 48747 0 
MN Lake ofthe wood 237 29575 0 
MN Le Seuer 238 212416 0 
MN Lincoln 239 51093 0.319202 
MN Lyon 240 284604 0.381786 
MN Mahnomen 241 32324 0.460741 
MN Marshall 242 113487 0.156740 
MN Martin 243 271713 0 
MN McLeod 244 304485 0.053345 
MN Meeker 245 149379 0 
MN Mille Lac 246 138849 0.470482 
MN Morrison 247 163645 0 
MN Mower 248 311570 0 
MN Murray 249 105810 0.220858 
MN Nicollet 250 177275 0.042786 
MN Nobles 251 223822 0.403418 
MN Norman 208 91421 0.211144 
MN Olmsted 207 599824 0.003077 
MN otter Tail 206 383761 0.170462 
MN Pennington 205 113536 0,. 006315 
MN Pine 204 94356 0.105070 
MN Pipestone 203 106521 0.206813 
MN Polk 202 270660 0.367069 
MN Pope 201 101158 0 
MN Ramsey 5120 5598377 0.083222 
MN Red Lake 182 41229 0.645370 
MN Redwood 183 232421 0.096277 
MN Renville 184 202461 0.016427 
MN Rice 185 322845 0 
MN Rock 186 107037 0.423573 
MN Roseau 187 118971 0 
MN Scott 5120 241162 0.099153 
MN Sherburne 6980 139055 
MN Sibley 188 127991 0 
MN st. Louis 2240 1276846 0 
MN Stearns 6980 880478 0.179185 
MN Steele 189 257018 0.001852 
MN Stevens 190 99243 0 
MN Swift 191 130619 0.249374 
MN Todd 192 153733 0.421386 
MN. Traverse 193 70944 0 
MN Wabasha 194 189350 0 
MN Wadena 195 109435 0.102490 
MN Waseca 196 138781 0 
MN Washington 5120 536275 0.193184 
MN Watonwan 197 139020 0 
MN Wilkin 198 69698 0 
MN Winona 199 466414 0.000806 
MN Wright 5120 360680 0 
MN Yellow Medicine 200 111674 0 
MT Beaverhead 1 70652 0 
MT Big Horn 2 71520 0 
County Branch share 
State county Msa number Total de:gosit Total de:gosit 
MT Blaine 3 50040 0 
MT Broadwater 4 16248 0 
MT Carbon 5 50702 0 
MT carter 6 14574 0 
MT Cascade 3040 533860 0 
MT Chouteau 7 61267 0 
MT Custer 8 191148 0 
MT Daniels 9 23278 0 
MT Dawson 10 118230 0 
MT Deer Lodge 11 79429 0.572272 
MT Fallon 12 41829 0 
MT Fergus 13 125398 0 
MT Flathead 14 376871 0 
MT Gallatin 15 379039 0 
MT Garfield 16 14345 0 
MT Glacier 17 77504 0 
MT Granite 18 19697 0 
MT Hill 19 149093 0 
MT Jefferson 20 17671 0 
MT Judith Basin 21 17548 0 
MT Lake 22 115218 0 
MT· Liberty 24 17658 0 
MT Lincoln 25 65782 0 
MT Madison 26 35230 0 
MT McCone 27 19889 0 
MT Meagher 28 16116 0 
MT Mineral 29 14207 0 
MT Missoula 30 426052 0 
MT Musselshell 31 43043 0 
MT Phillips 33 58316 0 
MT Pondera 34 73590 0 
MT Powder River 35 18778 0 
MT Powell 36 28130 0 
MT Prairie 37 27814 0 
MT Ravalli 38 151154 0 
MT Richland 39 118175 0 
MT Roosevelt 40 121518 0 
MT Rosebud 41 52734 0 
MT Sanders 42 41368 0 
MT Sheridan 43 86157 0 
MT Silver Bow 44 256659 0.246081 
MT Stillwate 45 44090 0 
MT Sweet Grass 46 37868 0 
MT Teton 47 49209 0 
MT Toole 48 98418 0 
MT Treasure 49 9058 0 
MT Valley 50 101291 0 
MT Wheatland 51 19991 0 
MT Yellowstone 880 975341 0 
